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The rise of land deals poses unpredictable risks to war-torn societies, exposing them to the
violent folds of the global economy. In Sierra Leone, commercial land leases have perpe-
tuated the chieftaincy monopoly, further curtailed social mobility, and sparked particular
resentment among youths and ex-combatants. Drawing on the concept of the “war
machine,” I analyse how Kamajor militia fighters shape contestation against land deals and
explore the attendant risks for remobilisation and conflict transformation. My findings,
based on in-depth ethnographic field research, indicate that while aggrieved communities
turn to Kamajor-run civil society organisations for support, Kamajor living in precarious
conditions largely shy away from open contestation. While the historically close ties
between theKamajor and the chieftaincyhaveeroded in thewakeof commercial land leases,
complex patronage networks along with the moral setback encountered from the Special
Court proceedings and tight surveillance thwart a more overt response. Yet, the Kamajor’s
background support remains key to the struggle of anti-plantation and mining activists.
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Post-conflict countries are under immense pressure to reconstruct and swiftly reintegrate
into global market flows. Accordingly, many of these countries have experienced a sharp
rise in land deals in the wake of war. Agricultural investments and mining concessions
are eagerly promoted by international organisations, such as the World Bank or the
International Monetary Fund, and by governments as a silver bullet for economic rural
development and, thus, post-conflict stability. However, large-scale investments may
pose unpredictable risks to war-torn societies that are particularly vulnerable to abrupt
agrarian transformations. Access to land and natural resources is not only key to eco-
nomic recovery but also contributes to successful reconciliation and the social (re)in-
tegration of former combatants and refugees (UNDP, 2013).
While much has been written on the impact of land deals and the many ways in
which they are experienced and contested, the literature on repercussions for post-
conflict settings remains largely under-informed (Borras et al., 2011; Deininger and
Byerlee, 2011; GRAIN, 2016; Hall et al., 2011; Hall et al., 2015; Ryan, 2017). What is
more, although a large number of land grab case studies are located in post-conflict
countries in the Global South, scholars have engaged only to a limited extent – if,
indeed, at all – with the consequences for societies in transition (but see Millar, 2016;
Cavanagh, 2017). I argue that this perspective is of particular importance when ana-
lysing agrarian transformation and the mobilisation efforts of affected communities in
post-conflict environments.
The conditions to invest in the agricultural and natural resource sectors in post-
conflict Sierra Leone were ideal for ex-mercenaries-turned businessmen, speculators,
or companies prepared to take advantage of a largely unmonitored market or willing to
take on high financial and reputational risks (Hennings, 2018a; Hilton, 2011: 13;
World Bank, 2018). Re-strengthened after the war, some paramount chiefs seized the
opportunities at hand and likewise capitalised on the post-conflict circumstances and
people’s hopes for development. Soon, more than 1.5 million hectares – equivalent to
21 per cent of Sierra Leone’s entire arable land – were leased to agribusiness investors
alone (ALLAT, 2013: 14). Apart from increasing inequality, such commercial land
deals have reinforced nepotism and the role of the paramount chiefs – exposing
communities to corruption, coercion, and violence. The sudden influx of money has
weakened local customs while further increasing class and intergenerational tensions
(see also Hennings, 2018a; Millar, 2016, 2018b).
My findings suggest that emerging grievances and growing inequality resulting from
commercial land investments resemble the dynamics that spurred the war in Sierra
Leone in the first place (Mitton, 2013: 326). The Truth and Reconciliation Commission
itself as well as a number of scholars have underlined how tensions over land, deep
intergenerational schisms and a disfranchised rural youth, a lack of trust in politicians
and customary authorities, widespread corruption, nepotism, and the unequal distribu-
tion of wealth were all key drivers that led to the outbreak of war (Fanthorpe and
Maconachie, 2010; Mitton, 2009: 462; Mokuwa et al., 2011; Richards, 2005; TRC,
2004a).1 Accordingly, the land and natural resource sectors remain critical elements of
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peacebuilding and recovery in Sierra Leone (Moyo and Foray, 2009: 1; Unruh and
Williams, 2013: 536).
While there is a remarkable scholarship on the war in Sierra Leone (1991–2002) and,
more specifically, on Charles Taylor’s Revolutionary United Front (RUF), child soldiers,
the illicit exploitation of the country’s eastern diamond fields, and interlinkages to
the conflict setting of the Mano River region (Abdullah, 1997; Hoffman, 2011; Keen,
2005; Muana, 1997; Reno, 1995; Richards, 1996), the long-term reintegration of
ex-combatants in rural areas and of militia fighters in particular remains underexplored
(but see Hoffman, 2011; Menzel, 2015b). My emphasis on ex-combatants will serve as a
lens through which to uncover the potential risks of land grabbing for peace and stability
in Sierra Leone (on the issue of civilian and ex-combatant classification, see Menzel,
2015b: 39). Drawing on assemblage thinking and specifically the concept of the “war
machine,” I examine the response of the former Mende militia fighters to the growing
capitalisation of land, livelihoods, and rural Sierra Leone under the umbrella of liberal
peacebuilding. Given the pre- and post-war similarities in exploitive and exclusive
conditions, I ponder whether the Kamajor2 have eventually reassemble in some form.
In contrast to other ex-combatants who mostly settled in urban Freetown, Bo, or
Makeni, the Kamajor largely returned to their chiefdoms in southern and eastern Sierra
Leone. Initially, the latter mobilised in the form of chiefdom-based defence units, a
reconfiguration of the Mende hunter and guardian ethos. Once the Kamajor gained
importance, they fought along with northern militias in the Civil Defense Force (CDF) as
part of the counter-insurgency. Depending on their (accumulated) prestige and class
affiliation, several militia members have benefitted from the recent surge of commercial
land deals while low-status Kamajor directly face negative externalities. Moreover, some
higher ranking Kamajor lost their war rewards in consequence of criticising the paramount
chiefs for selling out their people’s land and started taking a more critical stance towards
land deals. Since land has been of great importance to the Kamajor from a spiritual, ter-
ritorial, and livelihood perspective, I analyse whether and to what extent the chiefdom
militia fighters shape local resistance against mining and plantation operations in the
country’s south. Although their discontent is growing, my in-depth ethnographic field
research shows that the Kamajor largely shy away from openly supporting their com-
munities’ struggle. At the same time, affected community members turn to Kamajor-run
civil society organisations (CSOs) for support, including non-governmental organisations
(NGOs), civil society forums, as well as more formalised movements. That said, I explore
the strategic use of the variety of militia identities, the constant reinterpretation of Kamajor
images, and the prevailing Kamajor ethos upheld by many communities in contesting land
deals. Furthermore, I analyse how shifting alliances, loyalties, and waning trust play into
the novel configuration of a potentially broader rural resistance movement.
The article is structured as follows. After, first, illustrating the concept of the war
machine, I then, second, outline post-war dynamics in Sierra Leone with emphasis on the
reintegration of the Kamajor. Third, I discuss the repercussions of large-scale agricultural
and mining projects for militia members, illustrate related identity shifts, and trace resem-
blances to pre-war grievances. Fourth, analysing the Kamajor’s agency in contested land
deals, I highlight the role of Kamajor-run CSOs and the response of precarious Kamajor,
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which is largely thwarted by tight surveillance and repressive chieftaincies. Finally, I
explore entailed risks of land investments for remobilisation and conflict transformation.
Methods
This article is based on seven months of in-depth ethnographic field research in Sierra
Leone. Between March 2017 and March 2018, I carried out frequent field trips to land
conflict-affected areas in nine districts. The researched cases cover different stages of
conflict and community mobilisation emerging against projects ranging from recently
set up palm oil plantations to explorative or long-established mining operations. I applied
the ethnographic peace research approach that entails building up relationships and
spending time in ordinary conversations rather than single visits (Hennings, 2018b;
Millar, 2018a). Thus, I combined formal interviews, informal conversations with indi-
viduals or groups, and long-term participant and spatial observations with a focus on
processes of social differentiation and conflict transformation. My emphasis lay on the
Kamajor militia and ex-state military personnel in southern Sierra Leone. Moreover, I
interviewed community members, activists, labourers, company representatives, CSOs,
ministry officials, and town, section, and paramount chiefs while also attending the
National Paramount Chief Conference as well as several public and informal community
meetings in the provinces and in Freetown. I further reviewed existing studies, media
coverage, and community or NGO documentation on the land conflicts.
During the course of my fieldwork, I paid special attention to the challenges and
sensitivity of researching ex-combatants in post-war societies, which requires specific
considerations and do-no-harm measures (Hennings, 2018b; Wood, 2006: 373). While
there are fewer risks involved, in the sense of further stigmatisation or undermining local
reconciliation processes, reaching out to the Kamajor in Sierra Leone still requires tact and
time; the more so if researching responses to commercial land leases and their propensity
to violence. That said, I took a critical stance towards retrospective narrations of ex-
combatant identities and verified key findings with other informants or interviewees.
The War Machine, the State, and the Chieftaincy
With its emphasis on relationality, contingency, and transformation, assemblage
thinking is well suited to grasp the agency of ex-combatants in land deal contestation and
processes of change therein. Especially, urban movement scholars have recently com-
bined assemblage thinking and its notion of change with contentious politics (McFar-
lane, 2011; Rankin and Delaney, 2011). Unlike the rich literature on social movement
theories that focuses primarily on opportunity structures (Tarrow, 1996; Tilly, 1978),
framing (Benford and Snow, 2000), or the role of emotions (Goodwin et al., 2001),
assemblage thinking offers a more holistic approach to the understanding of social
movements. Notably, it refrains from seeing them as a coherent actor with a shared
collective identity and a set of common beliefs and norms (see also, Tilly and Tarrow,
2006). That said, this perspective goes beyond simply examining resistance along its
manifestations in official politics, everyday resistance, or more overt advocacy politics
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(Kerkvliet, 2009; Scott, 1985). Assemblage theory engages much more with the emer-
gence and potential of “contesting forces [that] are confronting, colliding, intersecting
and transforming” (Hawes, 2015: 15). Moreover, it allows an innovative perspective to
be taken on questions of trust and loyalty.
From an assemblage point of view, land investments affect not only communities and
the environment but also modes of production and living, the physical structure of vil-
lages, farms, ritual places, and forests, power dynamics, as well as spaces of agency
(Hennings, 2018a). Regarding the term territory Deleuze and Guattari distinguish
between three social dimensions that organise flows of power: the war machine, the
state, and the people who actually inhabit and govern the territory, including customary
authorities (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 411). Following Hoffman, I define state not as
an “entity up there” but as “a hierarchical mode of organizing power” (2011: 8–9). The
war machine stands in sharp contrast to the state that territorialises, for example, through
capitalising on natural resources, or by expanding “property rights over people” (Ferme,
2018: 159; Vandergeest and Peluso, 1995: 394). In a similar vein, chieftaincies terri-
torialise local residents and resources and, like the state, “distinguish the legal from the
illegal” (Hoffman, 2011:8), think along established principles, and aim to maintain
stability and order. In Sierra Leone, deeply rooted customary governance structures and
patronage networks evolve around elders, family headmen, the council, town, section,
and paramount chiefs, as well as land-holding lineages.3
Exclusive and top-down in nature, state or customary modes of power are met
everywhere with resistance. From an assemblage point of view, resistance expresses itself
in lines of flight that represent new ways of thinking or political realities different from the
established ones, such as shifting alliances, dissolving trust in authorities, and betrayals of
loyalty (Hawes, 2015: 32; Parr, 2011: 147). As I highlight elsewhere (Hennings, 2018a), in
Sierra Leone, these can take shape, for example, as heretofore unusual alliances between
land-holding and using families or emerging trans-chiefdom networks. Once these lines of
flight gain strength and eventually transform the contested status quo, a war machine has
emerged. Often mistaken to be violent and destructive, war machines are in fact more
likely to take shape as non-violent movements than on the field of battle. Their revolu-
tionary potential roots much more in the unheard of or unthinkable connections that
collectively aim to overcome existing grievances or injustices. For instance, Hawes (2015)
describes both the Interahamwe, a Rwandan militia group that played a key role during the
country’s genocide, and the Gac¸ac¸a courts dealing with its perpetrators as war machines.
Conceptually, the war machine allows different takes on resistance; in so doing, it bridges
social movement studies and the war studies literature.
The metaphor of speed bumps and potholes helps to illustrate the emergence of a war
machine or its forerunner, the lines of flight, respectively. While speed bumps are legal
state interventions to regulate traffic, spontaneously emerging potholes undermine or
even caricature those (Ho¨hne and Umlauf, 2018: 203). In contrast to evenly built speed
bumps, potholes are caused by erosion and emerge almost unnoticed on the edge or on
the most used stretches of a road. Similarly, embedded in the local cultural landscape,
various grass-root civil defence units – the majority of them Kamajor – emerged orga-
nically in response to the influx of RUF fighters from Liberia in the early 1990s. Unlike
26 Africa Spectrum 54(1)
the RUF rebels who fought against the customary authorities, the Kamajor were selected
via chieftaincy patronage networks vouching for the recruits’ trustworthiness and loyalty
(Hoffman, 2011: 74; Humphrey and Weinstein, 2004; on militia–local elite linkages, see
Schneckener, 2017: 799). Starting out as small emerging potholes as an antipode to the
rebel movement, the Kamajor became complicit with the state after 1995. Under the
umbrella of the CDF, the militias became part of the state’s counter-insurgent strategy
when the war dynamics shifted.
War machines spread quickly and in a non-linear manner until they “operate under
[their] own steam, beyond the control of the state” or customary state-like hierarchies
(Hoffman, 2011: 11). In other words, they de-territorialise by counteracting “state logic,
lines of kinship, [and] village association” (Hoffman, 2011: 13). Like unattended pot-
holes, war machines increasingly disrupt the smooth flow of activities and interactions
and turn existing orders upside down but are, nevertheless, always eventually captured
by the state or local state-like hierarchies, such as governments that do repair the pot-
holes. After the militias were captured by the state, they were driven rather by the “state
logic of profiteering” than by safeguarding their people (Ferme, 2018: 115; Hoffman,
2011: 243). As such, the CDF became increasingly institutionalised although its units
retained a certain degree of independence, steered by the local elite.
However, two interesting lines of flight emerged. First, some Kamajor units sym-
pathised with the peasant insurgency side of the RUF and partly rose up against their own
chiefs even despite the CDF’s strong anti-RUF identity (Hoffman, 2011: 69; Mokuwa
et al., 2011). This dynamic was closely related to the early years of war, when many
chiefs in Kailahun and Pujehun Districts sent their youth to support the RUF. As an elder
explained to me:
First, we sent our youth to Liberia to join the RUF. Then all the atrocities happened,
and we established the militias. Our youngsters were integrated into the communities
again but had to live up to the Kamajor slogan “never turn back.”
Nevertheless, some Kamajor did maintain close relationships to their former RUF
comrades and even collaborated at times. The second line of flight emerged in the late
war landscape, when the CDF partly turned against the Sierra Leone Army (SLA)
demanding a democratic government instead of the “contemporary postcolony” (Hoff-
man, 2011: 79). Yet, the Kamajor’s general loyalty towards their chieftaincies and their
communities of origin, as well as the general state capture of the civil defence units
thwarted these lines of flight and undermined the emergence of a fully fledged war
machine during war years.
The Kamajor’s Reintegration into Rural Post-War Sierra Leone
Considering the length of the war and the comparatively low fatal casualty rate, the
violence involved left behind a society of witnesses and survivors. In this vein, it is
striking that the collective trauma and mistrust, although existent, resurface mostly
during elections, as recently in 2018. To be sure, places and images are still linked to war
events and their disruptions, which left traces in social relations and agrarian practices,
for example. However, I do not see contemporary Sierra Leone as a warscape or would
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not speak of blurred boundaries between war and peace (Ferme, 2018: 12). That most
Sierra Leoneans have moved on is owed to the “reconciliatory attitude” of civilians and
ex-combatants who not only wanted to put the conflict behind them and focus on the
future but who often shared the grievances that led to war in the first place (Mitton, 2009:
463). Reconciliation and healing have, moreover, been largely determined by the “art of
forgetting” rather than memorising (Millar, 2016: 572; Shaw, 2007: 184). In this spirit,
Kamajor-community relations were remade and, like many Liberian refugees, the militia
fighters “became part and parcel of the communities” in the south (interview with the
coordinator of ALLAT, an NGO, Freetown, 10 March 2017). This stands in stark con-
trast to the reintegration of ex-RUF fighters, who were generally perceived as more
violent and at “odds with the gerontocratic social order that politicians and elders
scrambled to reassert in the wake of the war” (Bolten, 2012: 497) and who hence settled
rather in urban areas. In the following, I show that the reintegration of the Kamajor was
highly determined by their pre-war status and illustrate how patron–client networks
helped them to navigate the post-war environment.
The reintegration of the Kamajor went relatively smooth, as most had maintained
close ties to their networks and families (Humphrey and Weinstein, 2004: 2). They were
not only welcomed back by their communities but also by the local elite (on the bottom-
up and top-down legitimacy of militias, see Schneckener, 2017). About 75 per cent
returned to their communities – often along with fellow comrades – and many benefitted
from the country’s disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) programme
(Humphrey and Weinstein, 2004: 31). Most of my interlocutors still see the Kamajor as
heroes who are “honest, disciplined, patriotic, and care about their people” (see also,
Hoffman, 2011; Menzel, 2015b: 238–241; TRC, 2004b: 76–80). This is not self-evident
considering the militias were supposed to protect civilians from RUF and SLA attacks
while at the same time accounting for 2 per cent of war crimes. In interviews, only a
handful of civilians took a more critical stance and spoke about worried communities
reluctant to welcome teachers back who fought for any side in this “ruthless war” (former
councillor, Daru, Kailahun, 17 March 2018).
Profoundly weakened during the war, the country’s social fabric was quickly
rebuilt with a few adjustments with support from the United Kingdom’s Department
for International Development’s “Paramount Chief Restoration Programme” (see
also, Ferme, 2018: 162).4 Despite concerns about perpetuating corruption and
exclusive patronage networks concentrated around chiefs and land-owning families –
grievances that greatly contributed to the war – customary authorities were re-
strengthened and continued to control the definition of social space. What is more,
after the war paramount chiefs were re-inscribed as mediators between local,
national, and transnational politics and economics, which is part of what Ferme sums
up as “the delocalisation process of the chieftaincy” (2018: 150). The return of the
Kamajor indirectly added to the re-institutionalisation of the chieftaincy and overall
processes of re-territorialisation. The lines of flight that they had embodied were
quickly incorporated by the chieftaincy, and most of them were rewarded economi-
cally and/or politically for their bravery and sacrifices to protect the chiefdom (and
the country).
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Almost all Kamajor could improve their social standing compared to pre-war times.
Just as kinship loyalties and blood ties determined who was drafted, patron networks and
family background were key to securing benefits after the war like monetary compen-
sations, prestige, or political power (Mann, 2006; Schneckener, 2017: 813). Especially
higher ranking Kamajor, originating mostly from educated land-owning lineages,
became influential community stakeholders. These Kamajor could capitalise on their
militia identity and the Kamajor ethos in particular, which attributed them certain
leadership qualities. Until today, they have been appointed town and section chiefs,
speakers, or police officers. Others were integrated into the Sierra Leone Armed Forces
or are preferentially hired to manage and secure medium-scale mining operations. As
Amara, a highly respected (and feared) mid-ranking Kamajor, explained:
The mine owners trust me. They know I played an important role during the war, that I am
reliable. For example, if there is a fighting on site I just go there and they would immediately
stop. I’m also the chairman of the okada [motorbike taxi] association in Zimmi. My past
helps when I search for labourers. I know many youths from the war times who I can call.
(Zimmi, 9 May 2017)
Rewarding the returning Kamajor was not only a courtesy but also a necessity to
maintain local peace after the war. This was well-captured by an anti-mining activist in
Bonthe, one of the key Kamajor areas: “Being a warrior means you become a leader. But
you have to reward them at the end of the day” (interview, Moriba Town, 11 April 2017).
Becoming a Kamajor and participating in the war offered an opportunity to expand and
upgrade one’s sociopolitical networks and the promise to “transcend peacetime limita-
tions of establishing status” (Hoffman, 2011: 137; see also, Ka¨ihko¨, 2017). As a matter of
fact, these expectations did mostly materialise for those Kamajor who had maintained
influential patron–client relations before the war such as Amara, who largely benefitted
from his strong land-holding family background.
What it means to be a Kamajor has always varied a great deal and been subject to
constant renegotiation since their reintegration. The multifaceted Kamajor identity
cannot be limited to binary interpretations, but is rather fluid, contingent, and nego-
tiable by nature. Unlike other armed groups in the Mano River region, the Kamajor
fighters were less driven by an “opportunistic discourse of labour” – although a few did
later become mercenaries in Ivory Coast or Mali (Ka¨ihko¨, 2017: 54). Whereas some
Kamajor (and/or their families) hoped for material benefits and the accumulation of
status, militia membership also provided safety during the war that went beyond the
power of guns to other concerns – namely, protecting militia youths from being for-
cefully recruited by rebel groups. Many Kamajor have taken pride in the responsibility
to protect their communities and still link their identity to the hunter and guardian
trajectory of the Mende militias. On the other hand, especially younger Kamajor from
land-using and lower status families saw the militia rather as a “new youth-led
movement” (Hoffman, 2011: 69).
Depending on their networks, status, post-war rewards, and initial intention to join the
militia, Kamajor take different stands towards their lifetime initiation today. Particularly
for Kamajor who joined for rather pragmatic than idealistic reasons, who were deprived
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of post-war rewards, and/or deliberately immersed into civilian life, militia membership
does not necessarily constitute the most important part of their identity today.
Exclusive Land Deals, Patronage Politics, and
Growing Disparities
Studies on commercial land deals in Sierra Leone show that most communities face
precarious economic situations and perceive these investments as a “disappointing
experience” (Menzel, 2015a: 18; See Maconachie and Fortin, 2013; Millar, 2015).
Especially land-using families, women, youths, lower status Kamajor, and other com-
munity members who lack rich-men networks or who oppose these operations bear the
negative externalities (Hennings, 2018a; Ryan, 2017). Unfulfilled development promises
add to lost livelihoods, while marketisation increasingly expands into the social spaces of
rural Sierra Leone. The Activists for Change chairman summed up the situation at one of
the major rutile and bauxite extraction sites in West Africa in a nutshell:
You see, the same problems that caused the war are still there. The richer get richer and the
poorer get poorer. These people suffer! Look at the area, there are so many hazards! There
are dangerous gases, the dust causes health issues. The communities are in a fragile
situation! Any moment you must expect conflicts. Everyone is disappointed in Rutile
[general term for the two extracting companies]. Especially the Kamajor are frustrated.
(Interview Bonthe, 12 April 2017)
On the other hand, some paramount chiefs became “lynchpins” inspired by the neo-
liberal vision of capitalising on the chiefdom’s lands (Ferme, 2018: 147). In this process,
chieftaincy holders started drawing rather on their international corporate alliances for
political legitimacy than on local support.
Turning to the Kamajor, I argue that the militia fighters have different takes on the
repercussions of mining or plantation operations. Notably, I found that the Kamajor’s
different experiences of commercial land investments have added another layer to their
multifaceted identity. Considering their family background, the interpretation of their
militia membership, and their experience of the capitalisation of their (communities’)
land, the Kamajor can be roughly categorised into three groups. Certainly, these may
overlap at times or intersect with the experiences of other community members.
First, the co-opted beneficiaries are higher status Kamajor with influential networks
and patron–client relations – what Utas (2012) frames as “bigmanity” – who have
capitalised on recent land deals or even enabled those in the first place. These Kamajor
have a land-holding family background, feel rewarded appropriately after the war, and
have benefitted directly from contemporary land investments in their positions as sub-
chiefs, police officers, local politicians, or permanent company employees to name but a
few possibilities. It is in their interest to maintain the status quo, and hence further
territorialise the chiefdom, namely by suppressing critical voices or setting up speed
bumps in a figurative sense.
In sharp contrast to the former stands, second, the aggrieved precariat, whose lives
have been severely interrupted since the arrival of the companies. These include rather
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young Kamajor in their thirties and forties with lacking networks and/or who resumed
subsistence farming in the wake of war. Many tended to see the militia as a means to
fight the customary authorities, but feel ever more excluded today and perceive peace as
an “economic war” without future prospects (Ka¨ihko¨, 2017: 66). Large-scale land deals
offer few or no provisions for these Kamajor, which is being further exaggerated by rural
class tensions (Hennings, 2018a). Instead of benefitting from land lease promises, the
majority of these Kamajor lost their farm plots, are forced to work for the company as
low-paid temporary workers, or as job opportunities evaporated after the preparation
phase had no choice but to migrate elsewhere at high social cost to make a living.
Excluded from decision-making processes, post-war rewards, and rural development,
this group – along with non-combatant youths from land-using families – feels sold out
for the sake of elders’ profit. It is important to note that youth is less a question of actual
age than socio-economic status in Sierra Leone. Essentially, men are labelled as “youth”
up to their fifties, until their fathers and uncles eventually hand over power (see also,
Millar, 2016: 578). I show elsewhere how young men in particular are harassed, arrested,
and intimidated in the controlled spaces of plantations and mining operations and that
especially those with a Kamajor background are closely monitored (Hennings, 2018a:
537). Having said that, the aggrieved precariat not only bears the brunt of the land deals
but is also most likely to resist neo-liberal operations and the ruling elite.
Third, the smallest and most diverse group are the potential game changers, Kamajor
who became relatively influential after the war. Introducing this group, I expand on
Millar’s (2014) distinction between elites and non-elites in rural Sierra Leone. The game
changers ranges from higher status to mid-ranking well-educated Kamajor with land-
owning family backgrounds and influential networks. Many of them lost their war
rewards either in consequence of critically addressing the issue of land grabbing or by
refusing to sign lease agreements in their positions as family heads of land-holding
lineages or sub-chiefs. While most game changers benefitted or even were co-opted at
first, only few have been critical towards the negative externalities of the investments from
the outset. They tend to take the lifetime initiation and responsibility to take care of their
communities seriously, namely through actively engaging in community life or founding
CSOs to further rural development, save the environment, or enhance peace. As such,
game changers have publicly drawn parallels between the associated grievances of con-
temporary large-scale land deals and the unfair distribution of development before the war
(interviews Bo, 7 April 2017; Pendembu, 17 May 2018). They try to balance the widening
gap between the chieftaincy and the co-opted beneficiaries on the one side and the
aggrieved precariat including Kamajor and non-combatants on the other. In so doing, they
collaborate with the governing elite to maintain their status and networks, which they see
as an essential strategy to making a change. Yet, this increases uncertainty and despair on
the side of the aggrieved precariat who the game changers can only support covertly.
Reassembling Forces in Land Deal Contestations
As shown, the Kamajor relate differently to (post-)wartimes and experience the impact
of neo-liberal development projects in varying ways. I will highlight how this affects
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their agency and how they and deploy their capabilities accordingly. Departing from the
severe deprivation of their communities and/or their own families, my findings suggest
that some Kamajor increasingly oppose contemporary modes of neo-liberal development
and criticise the chieftaincy for withholding benefits. This is a delicate matter, as ex-
combatants are closely observed by society and authorities in particular regardless of
how well integrated they are (Hennings, 2018b). As such, they walk a tight rope by
taking part in public protests or other forms of contestation. In the following, I illustrate
how their opposition to exploitative land leases unfolds and, like the potholes on the edge
of the road, emerges almost unnoticed. Specifically, I outline how potential game
changers skilfully draw on their wartime networks and standing to back up activists and
community members and highlight the struggle of the aggrieved precariat.
Agents of Peace: The Power of Ex-Combatant-Run CSOs
Many communities involved in contested land deals turn to CSOs in southern Sierra
Leone that are run by Kamajor or ex-SLA soldiers for protection, material support, and
legal advice. These game changers feel called upon to monitor and prevent corruption
and unequal development and tend to rely more on the protector image part of the
Kamajor identity to make their way in the present. In the absence of state recognition,
being a protector can furthermore be seen as a strategy of ex-combatants to “create,
negotiate and maintain a masculine identity” (Barrett, 1996: 131). This role, moreover,
has been seen by many Sierra Leoneans as a way to make amends for war atrocities.
They killed. But people forgave them. They [the ex-combatants] have to prove that they are
sorry. Organising civil society is one way to give back. Most of them have skills and
knowledge. [ . . . ] Some paramount chiefs don’t care for their people. Some need to be
reminded why they were elected. So, some Kamajor became very strong civil society
members. (Interview with Abu Brima, Director of the Network Movement for Justice &
Development, Freetown, 4 May 2017)
Besides such altruistic reconciliatory reasons, founding an NGO in the aftermath of
war additionally provided a good income opportunity for well-respected and higher
status Kamajor, many of them trained teachers. In the late war landscape, some of them
used the power of bullets and banners simultaneously, being labelled “revolutionaries” in
the army or militias. Hassan, an influential former CDF battalion commander and direc-
tor of the Peace and Reconciliation Movement in Bo today, illustrated how CDF and
SLA members came together to advocate for peace and non-violence as early as 1995:
“We gave leaflets with messages to drivers who gave them out to the rebels when they
were stopped on the way. That’s how we started” (interview, Bo, 7 April 2017).
Twenty years on, when investors came to Hassan’s chiefdom of origin in Pujehun
District, he organised a delegation of former combatants-now-turned-activists to sensi-
tise the communities about the downsides of commercial land leases. The communities
and authorities highly trust and respect Hassan’s and his comrades’ Kamajor and family
background, and eventually the company had to leave before a nursery could be set up.
Another well-respected senior CDF commander became an influential radio station
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manager in rural Kailahun, where the war initially spilled over from Liberia. Although
his area is not directly affected (yet), he critically follows the impact of commercial land
deals and related issues of patronage and exploitation. Dedicated to civic education
today, he discusses human and land rights or roles and responsibilities of paramount
chiefs in his popular broadcasts sensitising communities and raising awareness on
challenges related to land leases and land tenure in general. Both Hassan and the radio
station manager use their social networks that emerged in wartime and expanded ever
since to mobilise around community issues. Their long-standing experience and ded-
ication to advocacy politics, extended horizontal and vertical networks, and the high
level of trust community members place in them make them ideal game changers in
contested land deals today. Frequent community requests to solve land conflicts and
other disputes have largely reframed their post-war identity. This has nurtured their sense
of responsibility, even if that was not their main motivation to join the militia in the first
place (Maringira, 2015: 78).
In one of the most prominent and contested land deals, the community turned to a
former SLA battlefield commander and close Kamajor ally and his local NGO.
Emmanuel used to be a teacher before the war, has a chief-house background, and was
captured by the Kamajor in 1999 to train them on warfare. He used to emphasise:
I’m a chief. I’m from this district, I have worked for the district, I fought for the
district! They know Director Fawundu everywhere in the district. I protect them. I talk on
behalf of them. I can call people from as far as Gabunde and they would come.
Due to his family background and role during the war – embodied in bullet wound
scars and tattoos indicating his social status – he is able not only to rely on a wide
network, including former CDF and SLA fighters, but also has access to customary
authorities and officials who tend to fear him. Even when NGOs were officially banned
from entering the chiefdom where the contested plantation was located, he could support
activists and aggrieved residents on-site. Subject to the availability of funding, his
NGO’s activities range from household surveys on the impact of plantation and mining
operations to mediation in political stalemates such as strikes, providing a safe space for
activists and association members to meet, initial advice to affected communities and
authorities, communicating emerging grievances to more influential NGOs and donors
in Freetown, and, most important, informal backroom diplomacy with local politicians
and customary authorities. While Emmanuel is without doubt dedicated to the com-
munities’ struggles, he sees his NGO work also as a crucial step towards becoming the
next paramount chief in his home chiefdom.
These examples illustrate how ex-combatant-run CSOs draw on their networks and
attributed power to support aggrieved communities. In so doing, they do not question or
disrespect customary authorities but quietly outmanoeuvre the local elites who, along
with the companies, capitalise at the expense of the communities. Given their reciprocal
relationship, these lines of flight – the fading trust of the game changers in customary
authorities – should not be underestimated. Nonetheless, I argue that the Kamajor’s
formal civil society commitment goes hand in hand with two major shortcomings. First,
Kamajor in these positions usually have a land-owning family background and thus tend
to represent the minority interests of land holders. Second, with few exceptions, their
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interest in supporting aggrieved communities is limited to their chiefdom(s) of origin or
neighbouring chiefdoms, if that. My findings also suggest that the peacetime identity of
the Kamajor is not at odds but rather blends with individual aspirations.
The Aggrieved Kamajor’s Predicament: Post-War Mistrust
and Broken Confidence
A different picture unfolds for aggrieved low-status Kamajor who lack influential networks
and have only limited opportunities to voice their grievances. Facing severe economic
deprivation, political exclusion, surveillance, and repression, the rather quiet response of the
aggrieved precariat is not surprising. The close collaboration of companies, paramount
chiefs, and the police creates fear in thecommunities and sends a clear signal to allwhoobject
to exclusive and exploitative land lease practices. At times, however, individual Kamajor of
this groupmight join protest marches in solidarity, attend community meetings, get together
covertly with like-minded fellows at motorbike workshops, or – like in the controversial
Socfin case of 2016 – help collect money to bail out activists. I contend that these Kamajor
face two major constraints, and thus take a somewhat hidden and covert approach.
First, time and again various Kamajor pointed out how the Special Court proceedings
(2002–2013) meant a serious setback to their self-confidence:
The Special Court killed the spirit! You can’t treat people who were sacrificing their life for
their people in that manner. The Kamajor thought whatever they have done, they have
sacrificed, is not appreciated. They are afraid they will be betrayed again. It’s also difficult
to lead activism, because they would be accused of gathering again. (Interview with a senior
CDF commander, Pendembu, 17 May 2018)
The deeply felt injustice that comparatively more leaders of the CDF than of any other
armed group were tried has prevailed in the country’s southern districts until today. This
left a mark on the younger, lower ranking Kamajor in particular, who were never
adequately rewarded in the aftermath of the war nor able to accumulate status or material
gains from the land deals. The lack of state recognition – the CDF’s ally, at that –
reinforced their feeling of being neglected by their own elders.
Second, the chieftaincies highly mistrust younger aggrieved Kamajor and keep a
close eye on their activities accordingly. They know it is easy for militia members to
mobilise and regroup after most Kamajor returned to their communities of origin, with
their bonds and hierarchy structures never fully disintegrated (Kilroy and Basini, 2018:
353). Fearing the mobilisation of male agency headed by battle-tested Kamajor, para-
mount chiefs and elders in highly contested land conflicts try to avert any Kamajor
gatherings
We don’t want that. We don’t want them to come together at all. You know, when those men
come together, they talk about the war. We don’t want any new war! (Interview with
paramount chief, Malen Chiefdom, 18 March 2018)
Demobilised and “a passive organisation now,” various high- and mid-ranking CDF
members emphasised that the Kamajor’s (trans-) chiefdom networks are still in place.
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They meet regularly but secretly, ever more so with the increasing number of conflicts
emerging around commercial land deals. The former CDF “director of war,” Moinina
Fofana, one of the first Kamajor initiates and Special Court convictee, added:
We call and talk to each other. I mean we all know each other. We understand each other
better than anyone else. [ . . . ] My comrades would support me if I am in trouble or need
their help. (Interview, Bo, 12 May 2017)5
By contrast, aggrieved low-status Kamajor aremostly unable to reach out to those networks
due to close monitoring in land lease conflict areas but also because of strong prevailing
hierarchies within the Kamajor network.While Fofana and other commanders may support
each other, they would not risk helping Kamajor outside of their own elitist peer group.
Moreover, the leaders and the Kamajor foot soldiers interpret their identity differently and
face varying challenges in contemporary Sierra Leone. As such, the rural Kamajor precariat
forms alternative alliances mirroring rural class boundaries so as to resist persistent, exclu-
sive patron–client networks and socio-economic deprivation. Instead of turning toKamajor-
run CSOs whom most do not feel sufficiently represented by, lower status Kamajor join –
whenever possible – forces with other game changers, often their own commanders. More-
over, they act in concert with other youthswithout necessarily sharing collective interests or
the same political views. These collaborations are rather born out of necessity and driven by
a “what’s in for me” point of view (see also Fligstein and McAdam, 2012: 51).
In Makpele Chiefdom, for example, precarious Kamajor and youth who make a living
off artisanal gold and diamond mining pooled their strength to resist a certain diamond
investment. Led by Amara, a mid-ranking, highly respected Kamajor, they went to the
exploration site and expressed their discontent. The company workers, in turn, recognised
the Kamajor among them immediately and left quickly after a short scuffle. Eventually, the
company withdrew even though the diamond deposits were promising.
Together, precarious Kamajor and youths tend to be fearless and do not shy away
from physical confrontation. In Sierra Leone, these remaining fault lines of violence
(Harris, 2006) are not limited to the actions of ex-combatants but also extend to the next
generation that grew up in the midst of violent conflict with the ethos of the Kamajor. As
Hawes (2015: 33) argues, political memories and trauma are inscribed in individual and
collective bodies and hence experienced across generations. Following the Mende tra-
dition of namesakes, many boys were named after militia fighters and so later, like the
mining-manager Amara, these warriors became key figures in their schooling. In so
doing, the legacy of the Kamajor as community protectors and warrior-heroes became
embedded in local storytelling and hence shifted the Kamajor’s identity retrospectively.
This reverberated especially back into the lives of the less recognised aggrieved
precariat.
In sum, the disproportionate emphasis on CDF leaders in the Special Court pro-
ceedings together with suspicious customary authorities including co-opted Kamajor
beneficiaries have weakened the aggrieved precariat’s contestation efforts and thwarted
closer collaboration with more influential game changers. Growing cooperation with
same-class youths indicates the emergence of potentially strong lines of flight, however.
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What is more, it suggests that low-status Kamajor remobilise but do not reassemble as a
group, in the sense of reactivating a dormant organisation.
Mind the Gap! Emerging Challenges for Rural Peace
Sierra Leone’s post-war economic development path has perpetuated the chieftaincy
monopoly, limited social mobility, and thus given rise to pre-war grievances sparking
resentment among ex-combatants and youths in particular. Especially, paramount chiefs
misuse their position as custodians of the land and agents of development to secure their
power and enrich themselves. Peter and Richards even compared related violent out-
breaks with “scenes from the civil war” (2011: 392). Multiple interlocutors have
expressed concerns about the emerging intra-community cleavages, increasing levels of
violence, and escalating confrontations with the police.
People are so frustrated! Sometimes, I get scared. People talk with so much passion
and emotions! They say “This land is the only thing we had since the war! We fought for
our survival on our own. If anyone takes it from us we have no other option but to fight!”
People think the government doesn’t consider them. If we aren’t careful, we’ll see people
killing for land again in the provinces. I’m not talking about war. People have had very
nasty experiences of fighting. In some cases, they have never seen the lease agreement.
They nearly beat up their paramount chief in Bari! When the news broke, the paramount
chief had to run! (interview with ALLAT coordinator, Freetown, 10 March 2017).
Frustration about exclusive land deals has frequently turned into violence against
paramount chiefs. In Lower Banta, which is part of a rutile concession, the paramount chief
was forced to move to the neighbouring chiefdom after his house – which he built with
misappropriated community funds – was burned down by youths including low-status
Kamajor. Elders as well as town and section chiefs, among them higher ranking Kama-
jor, even submitted a chiefdom case to withdraw his mandate. Even though there is a
tendency in Sierra Leone to exaggerate the actual conflict potential, the country’s approach
to preventing the recurrence of large-scale violence, increasing discontent, and dis-
satisfaction with customary authorities suggests that contemporary commercial land leases
nevertheless entail major risks for community coherence and conflict transformation.
The increasing alienation between the chieftaincy and the Kamajor in particular,
combined with mounting repression, has resulted in two major lines of flight: namely, the
waning trust of both game changers and the aggrieved precariat in the chieftaincy
alongside the emergence of low-status Kamajor and non-combatant youth alliances. Both
of these forces of contestation challenge the status quo and involve the strategic rede-
ployment of wartime identities. This underlines that membership of a fighting faction stays
a contingent part of their identity as the Kamajor navigate the present. Vice versa, affected
community members seek help from game changers because “they used to carry arms” –
which is, in the case of the militia fighters, still linked to images of their extraordinary
strength and courage. In this vein, the Kamajor protector ethos has been significantly re-
strengthened and incorporated by the game changers. Declining trust suggests the
Kamajor’s estrangement from the chieftaincy and co-opted (fellow) beneficiaries. Turning
away from exploitative chiefs and elders, a rather novel configuration of local resistance
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emerges that draws on wartime networks but likewise creates new alliances of which the
aggrieved precariat or game changers are only one part. Moreover, the contesting Kamajor
may follow different agendas, depending on their post-war identity and status. These range
from resentment to aspirations to qualify for future positions in the chieftaincy, protect the
communities from injustice, or secure their own livelihoods.
Besides, the Kamajor’s historical experience plays into their decision to engage in
contesting exclusive land deals and their choice of means. For now, it seems the legacy
of the Special Court and the Kamajor’s prevailing complex bonds to the chieftaincy
along with recent identity shifts, war fatigue, and the strategic advantages of non-violent
resistance in terms of (international) funding and legitimacy trump the “guns in their
minds” (Hoffman, 2011: 39). Whether some Kamajor living under precarious conditions
will eventually mobilise to fight alongside aggrieved youths is another question entirely.
Ultimately, violent means “may be a civil duty [ . . . ] to make it impossible for ‘business
as usual’ to continue” (Eliasoph, 2011: 229).
Especially young men not only have different expectations from land leases, but also
follow their ownways of engagingwith the state, chieftaincy, and corporate power (see also,
Hall et al., 2015: 482–483). It is relatively easy to reconfigure and (re)mobilise aggrieved
youths around the trajectory of the Kamajor that traces back to images of the kamajoisia;
“revolutionary youth culture, legacies of mercenary labour, and masculine responsibility”
(Hoffman, 2011: 71). In addition, the younger generation lacks the experience of war and
awareness of the costs of taking up arms and thus might be more inclined to be con-
frontational. History might repeat itself here, albeit with one important difference: loyal
bonds to the chieftaincy might not be an inherent part of the local resistance movement’s
identity. If growing inequality, nepotism, and exclusion are not addressed soon, it might
pave theway for stronger lines of flight that break away fromstateand chieftaincy rule. In so
doing, resistance might expand across chiefdom boundaries and spawn into a nationwide
movement. After all, the idea of militias is not limited to the Mende. Once the repercussion
of these forces of change, be it in the sense of banners or bullets, can no longer be anticipated
or controlledby the authorities, then rebelliousnesswill have turned into a newwarmachine.
Conclusion
Embedded in the land deal, agrarian transformation, and conflict transformation litera-
ture, this article takes a closer look at the impact of commercial land deals on post-war
stability and risks for reoccurring violence in Sierra Leone. Specifically, I have probed
the repercussions of land deals for the Kamajor militia fighters in the south of the country
as well as their responses thereto. While the Kamajor have never been a homogenous
group, I have highlighted the diversity of post-war identities and how these determine
expectations vis-a`-vis land deals and rural development.
The growing gap between co-opted beneficiaries as well as potential game changers
and the precariously placed Kamajor thwarts the re-emergence of the Kamajor militia, in
the sense of reactivating a dormant organisation. Instead, a novel configuration of
localised rural resistance against injustice is emerging in the wake of exclusive and
exploitative land deals. These movements might draw on the protector ethos of the
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Kamajor that experiences a revival. Yet, I have shown that despite resemblances to key
pre-war grievances, diminishing trust in the chieftaincy, and occasional violent out-
breaks, the emergence of large-scale violence is still unlikely for now due to prevailing
complex Kamajor–chieftaincy relationships, highly territorialised chiefdoms, and the
moral setback from the Special Court proceedings.
Conceptually, I propose a refinement of contentious politics that looks beyond
mobilisation and collective action but focuses on novel relational configurations, such as
the importance of dissolving trust and loyalty. The war machine has proved to be an
interesting angle that contrasts the readings of conventional social movement theories
and war studies, which struggle to capture contesting forces that collide and intersect and
yet contribute to the transforming of the status quo.
The empirical findings from this study offer several contributions to the current lit-
erature on Sierra Leone’s post-war legacies and development pathway. First, I show that
militia fighters look to each other for support but also draw just as much on wider
networks and patrons in their search for economic survival. As a matter of fact, in the
case of the Kamajor close networks with fellow fighters do not necessarily translate into
higher risks of a new war.
Second, and in line with other authors, my findings underline that DDR programmes
need to address the long-term needs of ex-combatants who continue to live in unequal
societies. In this vein, future research needs to explore in more detail what happens when
the post-war social contract unravels beyond events occurring in the national political
arena. Third, this analysis proves useful for expanding our understanding of the chal-
lenges that post-war militia fighters face in contemporary Sierra Leone, as most scholars
have hitherto focused on RUF fighters in urban areas. Fourth, this article has contributed
to filling the knowledge gap on the interplay of agrarian transformation and the response
of ex-combatants to modernisation and neo-liberal development politics. While many
post-war development agendas tend to justify commercial land deals, I argue in line with
critics of the liberal peace approach for the need to rethink and stop advertising large-
scale investments in the agricultural and natural resource sectors as a silver bullet. In so
doing, social and environmental justice must be considered key in peacebuilding efforts
– instead of economic growth based on uneven development.
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Notes
1. Long the argument of impoverished urban youth who lacked any source of social advancement,
with the availability of lootable diamonds and timber stocks prevailed (Abdullah, 1997).
2. Kamajor were initiated for life, which is why I don’t speak of “ex-Kamajor” but of the former
Civil Defense Force.
3. Patron–client relations constitute a connection of mutual reciprocity. In West Africa, indepen-
dence is rather seen as dangerous, which is why a person situates herself in relation to other,
more powerful persons (see also, Millar, 2014: 112).
4. About half of the chieftaincies (149 in total) were vacant after the war.
5. Their extraordinary strong bond can be traced back to the Kamajor’s initiation rites and the
immunisation of their fighters to the bullets of the enemy in particular. Combined with the
secrecy surrounding these initiation rites, Kamajor are still ascribed extraordinary powers to
this day (Hoffman, 2011: 242).
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Die ambivalente Rolle von Ex-Kombattanten im Widerstand
gegen Landinvestitionen in Sierra Leone
Zusammenfassung
Kommerzielle Landinvestitionen stellen insbesondere fu¨r Nachkriegsgesellschaften unvorher-
sehbare Risiken dar und setzen diese den Verwerfungen der Weltwirtschaft aus. In Sierra Leone
tragen Plantagen- und Bergbauprojekte zur Perpetuierung der Macht lokaler Eliten bei, erschweren
zunehmend die soziale Mobilita¨t und fu¨hren insbesondere bei Jugendlichen und Ex-Kombattanten
zu Frustration. Unter Bezugnahme auf das Konzept der war machine analysiere ich, wie die
Kamajor-Miliziona¨re den Widerstand gegen kommerzielle Landinvestitionen im su¨dlichen Sierra
Leone mitgestalten. Zudem untersuche ich, inwiefern umka¨mpfte Landinvestitionen zur Remo-
bilisierung von Ex-Kombattanten beitragen und Konflikttransformationsprozesse beeinflussen
ko¨nnen. Die Ergebnisse basieren auf umfassender ethnographischer Feldforschung und zeigen
einerseits, dass sich benachteiligte Gemeinden bevorzugt an die von Kamajor gefu¨hrten zivilge-
sellschaftlichen Organisationen wenden, um Unterstu¨tzung zu erhalten. Andererseits scheuen
insbesondere unter preka¨ren Bedingungen lebende Kamajor, die von den Vorzu¨gen der Land-
investitionen weitgehend ausgeschlossen sind, vor offenen Auseinandersetzungen zuru¨ck. Ich
argumentiere, dass obwohl die historisch engen Beziehungen zwischen den Kamajor und den
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lokalen Chiefs im Rahmen der kommerziellen Landpachtvertra¨ge erodieren, komplexe Klientel-
netzwerke in Verbindung mit der erfahrenen Demu¨tigung im Sondergerichtsverfahren und die
zunehmende U¨berwachung offenere Widerstandsformen verhindern. Dennoch bleibt die (indir-
ekte) Unterstu¨tzung der Kamajor zentral fu¨r den Kampf der Antiplantagen- und Bergbauaktivisten
und -aktivistinnen.
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